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We analyzed the security of the secure direct communication protocol based on secret transmitting
order of particles recently proposed by Zhu, Xia, Fan, and Zhang [Phys. Rev. A 73, 022338 (2006)],
and found that this scheme is insecure if an eavesdropper, say Eve, wants to steal the secret message
with Trojan horse attack strategies. The vital loophole in this scheme is that the two authorized
users check the security of their quantum channel only once. Eve can insert another spy photon,
an invisible photon or a delay one in each photon which the sender Alice sends to the receiver Bob,
and capture the spy photon when it returns from Bob to Alice. After the authorized users check
the security, Eve can obtain the secret message according to the information about the transmitting
order published by Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of this protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Since an original quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme was proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1] in 1984
(BB84), quantum communication has progressed quickly.
There are several remarkable branches of quantum com-
munication, such as QKD [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], quantum
secret sharing [9, 10, 11], quantum secure direct commu-
nication (QSDC), and so on. QKDwhose task is to create
a private key between two remote authorized users is one
of the most important applications of quantum mechan-
ics in the field of information. By far, there has been a
lot of attention focused on QKD [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
QSDC is a new branch of quantum communication and
is used to transmit a secret message directly without
creating a private key in advance [12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
In 2002, Bostro¨m and Felbinger proposed a quasi-secure
quantum direct communication protocol, called ”ping-
pong” protocol [15]. They used Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pairs as quantum information carriers (QIC), fol-
lowing some ideas in quantum dense coding [17]. How-
ever, it has been proved insecure in a noise channel [18].
In 2003, Deng et al. put forward a two-step QSDC pro-
tocol using a block of EPR pairs [12] and another one
with a sequence of single photons [13]. Wang et al. [14]
introduced a high-dimension QSDC scheme.
Another class of quantum communication has been
called deterministic secure quantum communication
(DSQC) [19] in which the receiver can read out the se-
cret message only after the transmission of an additional
classical bit for each qubit, different from QSDC in which
the secret message can be read out directly without ex-
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changing classical information anymore. Compared with
QKD, DSQC can be used to obtain a deterministic in-
formation, other than a random binary string. Recently,
Gao et al. [20, 21] and Man et al. [22] proposed several
DSQC protocols based on quantum teleportation [23] and
entanglement swapping [24]. Although the users have to
exchange a lot of classical information to obtain the secret
message, they can check the eavesdropping before they
transmit the secret message, and the qubits which carry
the secret message need not be transmitted again after
the users check eavesdropping. Therefore these schemes
may be more secure in a noise channel and more conve-
nient for quantum error correction [19].
Recently, Zhu et al. [25] proposed a new secure direct
communication protocol using EPR pairs as QIC (We
called it ZXFZ protocol for short below), similar to the
two-step QSDC protocol [12]. The transmitting order
of particles is secret to any other people except for the
sender, and the most important advantage emphasized is
that this protocol only needs one security checking pro-
cess. However, we found this scheme is insecure just due
to lack of sufficient security-checking processes. We can
use the Trojan horse attack strategy [5] to get the se-
cret message completely without leaving a trace. In this
paper, we first review the protocol they proposed and
then introduce the way to eavesdrop it freely. Finally,
we present a possible improvement of this secure direct
communication scheme.
II. EAVESDROPPING ON THE SECURE
DIRECT COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
It is well known that a crucial issue of secret commu-
nication is its security. The security of quantum commu-
nication is guaranteed by the principles in quantum me-
2chanics against an eavesdropper with unlimited powers,
whose technology is confined only by the laws of quantum
mechanics. For QSDC or DSQC protocols, their security
is more important than that in QKD protocols because
they are used to transmit a secret message, other than a
private key.
Now, let us start with the brief description of the
ZXFZ protocol [25]. First, Alice and Bob agree that
the four unitary operations U0 = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|, U1 =
|0〉〈0|−|1〉〈1|, U2 = |0〉〈1|+|1〉〈0|, and U3 = |0〉〈1|−|1〉〈0|
represent two bits of classical information 00, 11, 10, and
10, respectively. Alice prepares a sequence of EPR pairs




|1〉Hi |0〉Ti), and then divides them into two parter-photon
sequences. She keeps one sequence (home sequence) in
her laboratory and sends the other sequence (travel se-
quence) to Bob through a quantum channel. After re-
ceiving the travel sequence, Bob chooses a sufficiently
large subset of photons as a checking set (C set) and the
rest as a message set (M set). Bob encodes his check-
ing message and secret message by performing the four
unitary operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) on the C set and
the M set respectively. Then Bob rearranges the order
of the T sequence and returns them to Alice. After Alice
claims her receipt of all the T sequence, Bob announces
the position of the C set and the secret order in it. Al-
ice performs the Bell-state measurements on the checking
photons and publishes the results. Bob can distinguish
whether there is an eavesdropper monitoring their quan-
tum line by comparing his checking message with Alice’s
outcomes. If there exists an eavesdropper, Bob termi-
nates the communication. Otherwise, he exposes the se-
cret order of the M set, and then Alice can obtain the
secret message with Bell-state measurements.
The security of the ZXFZ scheme [25] is based on the
secret order of the particles. However, the secret order
will be published by Bob after the security checking. One
can see that the two authorized users only check the se-
curity once in the line from Bob to Alice. The secret
message is encoded with the unitary operations done by
Bob. If Alice and Bob cannot detect the eavesdropper
during the checking process, Eve can get the secret or-
der and the whole secret message. The eavesdropper can
utilize the loophole that the users do not check the secu-
rity of the quantum channel from Alice to Bob to insert
some additive photons in each legitimate one to get Bob’s
operation information freely. There are two kinds of Tro-
jan horse attack strategies. One is the invisible photon
eavesdropping (IPE) scheme proposed by Cai [26] and
the other is the delay-photon Trojan horse attack [5, 27].
Firstly, the invisible photon eavesdropping scheme uti-
lizes the fact that the single photon detector is only sensi-
tive to the photons with a special wavelength [26]. There-
fore, Eve can select a wavelength far away from that the
authorized users use, which is invisible to Bob’s detector.
But there exist some problems if Eve uses the IPE to at-
tack the quantum communication protocols in which the
wavelength-dependent optical devices are used to code
the useful information. That is, Eve maybe obtain noth-
ing about the information of the operations done by the
legitimate users with optical devices (such as λ/2 and
λ/4 plates) if the wavelength of the invisible photon is
far away from that used by the users. However, it is
worthy to point out that no security checking is per-
formed in the line from Alice to Bob, which is a serious
security loophole of the ZXFZ protocol [25]. Eve can
choose a special wavelength which is close to the legit-
imate wavelength to produce the invisible photons. As
we assumed [5, 18], Eve has absolutely no technological
limits for her eavesdropping; i.e., she can do everything
that quantum mechanics does not explicitly forbid. Since
the number of photons and the polarization of a photon
are commutative, Eve can insert a spy photon in each
signal pulse and sort it out without disturbing the state
of the travel photon of Alice’s in principle. Now we ana-
lyze the attack scheme in detail. First, the eavesdropper
Eve prepares a sequence of EPR pairs with the wave-
length λ′ (The legitimate wavelength is λ, λ′ ≈ λ. Eve
can distinguish them in principle even though there may












). When Alice sends
the T sequence to Bob, Eve adds her T ′ sequence to the
T sequence and forwards them to Bob. In detail, Eve
inserts each photon T ′ into the photon T’s pulse. When
Bob performs his unitary operation on the T sequence,
he also performs his operation on the T ′ sequence Eve
sent. After Bob rearranges the order of the T sequence,
Eve captures her spy photons when they run back from
Bob to Alice, and stores them. It is important to point
out that all of the operations Eve does have no effect on
the secret order and the secret states of the Alice’s T
sequence. Since the optical devices used to accomplish
the unitary operations are often wavelength-dependent in
practical, the information carried by Eve’s additional se-
quence T ′ is not as exactly same as the photon sequence
T in the line from Bob to Alice. However, since λ′ is close
to λ, the probability that Eve obtain the correct outcome
with her Bell-state measurements is close to 1. In other
words, almost all the information about the secret mes-
sage will be leaked to Eve without being detected. After
Alice and Bob accomplish the security checking, Eve can
rearrange the sequence order according to the informa-
tion published by Bob, and do the same measurements as
Alice to obtain Bob’s secret message with a large proba-
bility in principle.
Secondly, the delay-photon Trojan horse attack [27] is
inserting a spy photon in a legitimate signal with a de-
lay time, shorter than the time windows. As we know,
in experiment there is a ”door” (a time window) of the
optical device which is open only during a short time,
i.e., only when the qubits arrive. In order to limit the
Trojan horse attack, the door should be open only dur-
ing a time as short as possible [28]. However, in practice,
timing has a finite accuracy, the eavesdropper Eve with
a infinite power can add her probes before or after the
legitimate pulses. Different from the IPE attack, the de-
3lay spy photon has the same wavelength as the legitimate
photon. Therefore the spy photon sequence T ′′ will carry
the same information as the legitimate T sequence. Eve












), and insert her
T ′′ sequence into the T sequence when Alice sends it to
Bob. In detail, Eve inserts each T ′′ photon after each T
pulse with a delay time which is shorter than the time
windows of Bob’s optical devices. Since the T ′′ photons
have the same wavelength as the T photons, Bob will
perform the exact same operation on the T ′′ sequence
when he performs his unitary operations on the T se-
quence. Eve sorts out her T ′′ photons when Bob returns
them back to Alice, and rearranges the order according
to the information published by Bob after Alice and Bob
complete their eavesdropping checking. Thus Eve can
perform the Bell-state measurement on her spy photons
and get the secret message fully and freely.
Certainly, these attack schemes also work for the other
QSDC protocols, such as those in Refs. [13, 14, 15].
However, the user can exploit a complex eavesdropping-
checking process to avoid it [27]. As there is not eaves-
dropping checking when the photons are transmitted
from the sender Alice to the receiver Bob in the ZXFZ
protocol [25], this attack cannot be detected in principle.
III. IMPROVEMENT TO DEFEAT THE
TROJAN HORSE ATTACK
In order to defeat Eve’s IPE attack, a filter with which
only the wavelengths close to the operating one can be
let in should be added before all of the Bob’s devices.
In this way, Eve’s invisible photons will be filtered out.
Moreover, a photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50), which
is used to divide each signal into two pieces, should be
introduced to defeat the delay-photon Trojan horse at-
tack. Thus, with the PNS and two single-photon mea-
surements the users can distinguish whether there exists
a multiphoton signal (including the delay-photon signal
and the invisible photon whose wavelength is so close to
the legitimate one that it cannot be filtered out with the
filter). Although a PNS is not feasible with current tech-
nology, the users can use a photon beam splitter (PBS:
50/50) to prevent Eve from stealing the secret message
with a little modification [27].
In order to improve the security of the ZXFZ proto-
col [25], we have to take these two kinds of attacks into
account. For integrity, we describe the improved ZXFZ
protocol in steps as follows.




(|0〉Hi |1〉Ti − |1〉Hi |0〉Ti) and divides them into
two sequences, the home (H) sequence and the travel
(T) sequence, same as Refs. [14, 25]. She sends the T
sequence to Bob.
(2) Bob inserts a filter in front of his devices to filter
out the photon signal with an illegitimate wavelength,
and then chooses a sufficiently large subset of photons
randomly. He splits each sampling signal with a PNS
and measures the two signals after the PNS with the
two measure bases σz and σx chosen randomly. If the
multiphoton rate is unreasonable high, Bob terminates
the transmission and repeats the communication from
the beginning. Otherwise, he continues to the next step.
(3) Bob chooses a large subset of photons from the pho-
tons remained as checking set (C set) and the others as
the message set (M set). He encodes his message (check-
ing message and secret message) by performing one of
the four unitary operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3). Then he
disturbs the initial order of the photons in the T sequence
and returns them to Alice.
(4) After Alice announces the receipt of all the T pho-
tons, Bob tells her the position and the order of the C set.
Alice performs the Bell-state measurement on the pho-
tons in the C set and publishes the results with which Bob
can estimates the security of the transmission. If there is
an eavesdropper, Bob stops the communication. Other-
wise, Bob publishes the order of the M set, and Alice can
obtain the secret message with Bell-state measurements.
The improved ZXFZ protocol introduces a filter and
another eavesdropping-checking process to defeat the
IPE and the delay-photon Trojan horse attacks. In prin-
ciple, the eavesdropper Eve with a infinite power can al-
ways find loopholes in quantum communication protocols
with a non-ideal quantum channel. Our improvement
can only counter the attacks we have already known. If
some sophisticate Trojan horse attacks would be put for-
ward in the future, we should choose a more complex
eavesdropping-check way. The sticking point we want
to emphasis is that two times of security checking is in-
evitable to ensure this bidirectional secure communica-
tion, same as those in the two-step protocol [12]. In this
way, the origin ZXFZ protocol [25] cannot improve the
efficiency of secure communication and has no superior-
ity, compared with the two-step QSDC scheme [12], not
the case announced by the authors [25]. It is worthy to
point out that if the authorized users perform the secu-
rity checking twice, the step to disturb the order of the
photons in the T sequence can be reduced, and Alice can
read out the secret message directly without the infor-
mation of the order Bob published if Bob also has the
capability of storing the quantum states. In this way,
the protocol is equivalent to the QSDC scheme proposed
by Wang et al. [14]. On the other hand, the improved
ZXFZ protocol is useful if one of the two users, i.e., the
sender of the secret message (Bob), does not have the
device for storing quantum states. In this time, Bob can
sample some photons from the T sequence synchronously
for checking eavesdropping in the line from Alice to Bob,
and then disturbs the orders of the others after encod-
ing the message. The process for eavesdropping checking
of the line from Alice to Bob needs not the storage of
the other photons, which will reduce the requirements
on Bob’s devices largely in a practical application.
4IV. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In Ref. [25], the authors also proposed a one-way se-
cure direct communication scheme based on the secret
transmitting order of particles with EPR pairs. We found
this scheme is secure in an ideal quantum channel. Also,
the authors announced that their one-way scheme greatly
reduces the opportunity of the particles being intercepted
than the two-step protocol [25]. Unfortunately, we found
that the opportunity of the particles being intercepted in
these two schemes is the same one. In both schemes 2N
(N is the number of EPR pairs used) particles were trans-
mitted from Alice to Bob. The only difference between
those two protocols is that the 2N particles is transmit-
ted in one step in the one-way scheme [25] and through
two steps in the two-step protocol [27]. In the two-step
protocol the receiver can read out the secret message di-
rectly. But in this one-way scheme, for each qubit infor-
mation to be understood at least one additional classical
bit of information is exchanged. Both these two proto-
cols need the quantum memory. Suppose the times for
the transmission of the photons and the classical infor-
mation transmitted from one user to the other both are
t (Let us neglect the time for measurement and com-
parison). We found that the receiver needs to store the
2N particles at least for 4t time in the one-way scheme
[25] and he stores N particles at least for 2t time in the
two-step scheme [12]. In detail, in the one-way scheme
[25] the receiver (Bob) should first tells the sender (Al-
ice) the information that he has received all the photons,
and then Alice publishes the positions of the photons in
the checking set (i.e., C set) and their orders. After Bob
transmits the outcomes of the C set to Alice, she tells
him the orders of the other photons. That is, Bob at
least stores the 2N photons for four times of the time t.
In the two-step protocol [12], after receiving the checking
sequence Bob first picks out some samples and measures
them, and then he exchanges some classical information
with the sender Alice. If the transmission of the check-
ing sequence is secure, Alice sends the other sequence to
Bob. In this time, Bob need in principle store the check-
ing sequence for two times of the time t. From these
analyses above, we can see that the two-step protocol is
more convenient than the one-way scheme proposed by
Zhu et al. [25].
In summary, we analyzed the security of the secure
direct communication proposed by Zhu et al. [25] and
found that this protocol is insecure because the two
parties only execute one security-checking process. We
proved that the eavesdropper can get Bob’s secret mes-
sage with a large probability without being detected by
using the invisible photon eavesdropping scheme [26] or
get all the secret message with the delay-photon Trojan
horse attack [27]. We also present a possible improve-
ment of this protocol by introducing a filter and another
complex security-checking process to defeat these two
kinds of attacks. The most important point is that for
each block of transmission, an eavesdropping checking is
inevitable for secure communication no matter what is
transmitted with a quantum channel.
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